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prize (sponsored by the Fannie Mae Foundation) presented at the
1999 American Real Estate Society Annual Meeting.
This article presents an alternative mortgage that retains the
ﬁxed-rate feature of a ﬁxed-rate mortgage (FRM), but accelerates
the principal amortization when interest rates rise, exposing the
buyer to less duration risk in a rising interest rate environment.
This mortgage, labeled the adjustable amortization mortgage
(AAM), is shown to have lessened interest rate risk for the buyer
as well as lower default risk, suggesting that it should be priced
higher (at a lower rate of interest) than the typical FRM. It is
also shown that mortgage-backed securities collateralized by an
AAM have much less price volatility than mortgage-backed
securities backed by FRMs.
Introduction
A large percentage of intermediate-to-long-term (ﬁfteen years and longer)
residential and commercial mortgages in the United States is sold into the
secondary mortgage market (SMM). These mortgages are then bundled together,
usually by credit quality, interest rate and term, and securities are sold using the
cash ﬂow from the bundled mortgages as the basis for payment. Although a variety
of securities may be sold, one of the most common is the collateralized mortgage
obligation (CMO), which is divided into separate slices or tranches—each with a
different priority on the cash ﬂow from the underlying mortgages.
Buyers of CMO tranches face a variety of risk factors—among them interest rate
risk, prepayment risk and duration risk. Although CMO writers may take a variety
of steps to attempt to reduce these risk factors, such as creating planned
amortization class (PAC) tranches, pooling adjustable-rate mortgages, and the like,
these risk factors cannot be eliminated entirely. In fact, prepayment risk (the risk
that prepayments by mortgagors will differ from what is expected) remains a
telling problem for CMO writers since virtually all residential mortgages may be
prepaid in whole or in part at any time without penalty.74  Thode
Prepayment risk is exacerbated by the fact that prepayments tend to accelerate as
interest rates decline (home sales and reﬁnancings increase), and to decelerate as
interest rates rise (home sales and reﬁnancings decrease). Thus, the duration of a
CMO tranche investment tends to move in the same direction as interest rates.
This is an especially acute problem when interest rates rise. In this environment,
CMO investors see a decline in the value of their investments in two ways: the
increase in interest rates reduces the present value of future interest and principal
cash ﬂows; and, as prepayments decline, duration increases—further diminishing
the value of expected cash ﬂows.
In this article, a new type of ﬁxed-rate mortgage—the adjustable amortization
mortgage (AAM)—is proposed as a partial solution to the prepayment risk/
duration risk problem faced by CMO investors. Like a standard ﬁxed-rate
mortgage (FRM), the interest rate on an AAM is ﬁxed for the term of the
mortgage; unlike a standard FRM, the payments (and, hence, the amortization of
principal) increase in response to a rise in the general level of interest rates. It is
shown that CMOs (and their respective tranches), which are written against pools
of adjustable amortization mortgages, have much lower levels of prepayment risk
and duration risk in a rising interest rate environment. Thus, owners of AAMs
and the securities written against them have less downward price volatility. Ceteris
paribus, AAMs and securities written against them should command premium
prices (lower yields) than corresponding standard ﬁxed-rate mortgages and
securities written against them.
 Prior Research
The effects of interest rate changes, prepayments and duration on the pricing of
mortgages has been the subject of widespread research. Kau, Keenan, Muller and
Epperson (1993) develop a contingent claims model for mortgage pricing based
on the interest rate model of Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985). Kau et al. show that
the prepayment option may be of great value to the borrower under a FRM and,
hence, an important component in the pricing of FRMs. Haensly, Waller and
Springer (1993) focus on duration and price behavior in FRMs.
Archer and Ling (1993) develop a model of mortgage prepayment, which includes
suboptimal (non-interest-rate driven) prepayments as well as the endogenous
interest-rate call, while Hakim (1997) analyzes the distinction between induced
and autonomous mortgage prepayments. He ﬁnds evidence of a signiﬁcant
relationship between borrower characteristics, property age and regional mobility,
and mortgage termination rates.
Thode (1991) develops a ﬁxed payment, adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) and
demonstrates that it has less default risk and less interest rate risk than a standard
ARM. Thode and Kish (1992, 1994) construct a FRM that uses a prepaid zero
coupon treasury bond for principal repayment. They show that this mortgage has
less prepayment (and duration) risk than a standard FRM.CMOs, Duration Risk and a New Mortgage  75
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Numerous studies have explored the prepayment patterns of ARMs and FRMs
and the effects of prepayments on the valuation of mortgage-backed securities.
These include Anderson, Barber and Chang (1993) who focus on the effects of
prepayments on duration, Richard and Roll (1989) and McConnell and Singh
(1991) who evaluate interest-dependent prepayments and their effects on risk.
Richard and Roll, and McConnell and Singh note that interest-dependent
prepayments are most signiﬁcant in the early years of a mortgage, and more
signiﬁcant in the pricing of FRMs than in ARMs. Kau and Springer (1993) model
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial effects on the prepayments of twenty-seven GNMA
pass-through securities. They ﬁnd that, in many cases, non-ﬁnancial factors (such
as the season of the year) dominate ﬁnancial factors in prepayment behavior.
The literature is replete with studies of consumer choice between FRMs and
alternative mortgage instruments (AMIs). Brueckner and Follain (1988, 1989) ﬁnd
that the surge in ARM originations in the early 1980s was strongly related to
movements in the level of interest rates, and spreads between ARM and FRM
interest rates. Sa-Aadu (1987), studying a random sample of 338 ARMs originated
at a Midwestern savings and loan association between 1979–84, found that
consumers reaped a signiﬁcant windfall gain by choosing ARMs over FRMs.
Szerb (1996) analyzes the choice between FRMs and ARMs in the presence of
both nominal and real shocks to interest rates. He ﬁnds that exposure to more
nominal interest rate shocks will decrease the probability of ARM choice, while
exposure to more real interest rate shocks will decrease the probability of FRM
choice. Stanton and Wallace (1998) develop an equilibrium contingent claims
mortgage valuation algorithm that allows investors to account for self-selection
when valuing mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.
 Duration
Measurement of the price elasticity of a stream of ﬁxed cash ﬂows can be
accomplished through the statistic known as duration, which was ﬁrst proposed
by Macauley (1938). Fundamentally, duration seeks to measure the effective
maturity of a stream of cash ﬂows. In Macauley’s formulation, the weight of each
receipt is related to the importance of the receipt in a present value context.
Although Macauley’s original formulation has been reﬁned and modiﬁed through
time (e.g., Anderson, Barber and Chang, 1993), authors such as Bierwag, Kaufman
and Toevs (1983) show that Macauley’s measure performs quite well against latter
formulations.
The general formulation of Macauley duration is given by:
N t*CFt DUR  t (1  r) t1
(1) N CFt m  t (1  r) t176  Thode
where:
CFt  Payment (cash ﬂow) the security will make in time period t;
N  Number of time periods until the maturity of the security;
r  Security’s required return (per period); and
m  Number of periods per year.1
If we deﬁne modiﬁed duration (DURmod)a sDUR/(1  r), then modiﬁed duration
multiplied by a given change in (annualized) yield (or required return)
approximates for the negative of the expected percentage price change or return
on a security:
DUR r*m  PRICE/PRICE. (2) mod*
Duration is an absolute measure of interest-rate risk and is particularly applicable
to ﬁxed-payment securities. It can then be applied to compare the price sensitivity
of different securities. However, as will be noted later, Equation (2) approximates
for the negative of the expected percentage security price change only if there is
no change in the expected cash ﬂows each period (CFt) as a result of a change in
interest rates (required returns).2
 CMO Valuation and Risk
For any given CMO backed by a pool of FRMs, the market value of a particular
Tranche j (Vj) may be modeled as:
V  ƒ(C , F , r , T ), (3) jj j j j
where:
Cj  Periodic coupon interest paid to Tranche j;
Fj  Face value principal amount of Tranche j;
rj  Required rate of return on investment for Tranche j; and
Tj  Expected time to maturity for Tranche j.
The value of Tranche j at any given point time t is equal to the present value of
the future cash ﬂows received over N time periods, or:
N (C  P ) j,tj ,t V  , (4)  j t (1  r) t0 jCMOs, Duration Risk and a New Mortgage  77
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where:
Pj,t  Principal payments to Tranche j during time period t  Fj). (Pj,t
The total cash ﬂow to Tranche j at time period t (CFj,t) is equal to the sum of the
coupon payments—Cj,t—plus the principal payments—P . In a typical ﬂow- 3
j,t
through CMO, principal payments to the tranche consist of the normal, amortizing
principal paid by mortgagors each period plus principal prepayments made in
whole (as in the sale of the home or a reﬁnancing), or in part (as in the case of
a mortgagor who elects to make an additional, partial principal payment).
If the coupon payments (Cj,t) and principal payments (Pj,t) are divided into
separate claims, then the value of the interest-only stream to Tranche j (IOj)i s
given by:
N Cj,t IO  (5)  j t (1  r) t0 j
And the value of the principal-only stream to Tranche j (POj) is given by:
N Pj,t PO  . (6)  j t (1  r) t0 j
Thus, Vj  IOj  POj if the discount rates are equal in all three cases.
Therefore, the total value of the cash ﬂows to a CMO tranche depends on the
timing and amount of the interest (coupon) and principal payments, and the
discount rate applied to these cash ﬂows. In turn, the discount rate (required rate
of return) may be modeled as a function of the riskless rate of interest (rƒ) plus
a risk premium (RP), or:
r  r  RP , (7) j ƒ j
where:
RPj  risk premium appropriate for the cash ﬂows to Tranche j.
The risk premium is a function of a variety of risk factors including the default
risk of the underlying mortgages, and the expected duration of the cash ﬂows to
the tranche (which is affected by the expected rate of principal prepayments on
the underlying mortgages).78  Thode
 Prepayment Rates on FRMs
Unlike other forms of debt, the vast majority of residential mortgages may be
prepaid in whole or in part by the mortgagor at any time without penalty. In the
absence of penalties, the main factors affecting the rate of prepayments are: (1)
housing turnover (home sales); (2) reﬁnancings; and (3) involuntary prepayments
due to death, divorce, foreclosure, etc. (see Bartlett, 1994). Home sales are the
prime factor in prepayments when an existing mortgage is selling at a discount;
reﬁnancings are the prime factor in prepayments when an existing mortgage is
selling at a premium.
Of critical importance to the mortgagee and the owners of securities written
against mortgages is the effect of prepayments on the market values of their
holdings. In general, prepayments tend to moderate the increase in mortgage and
mortgage-backed security prices when interest rates fall. Falling interest rates tend
to accelerate prepayments both because housing turnover tends to increase (more
prospective homebuyers qualify for mortgages, increasing housing demand) and
because reﬁnancing activity increases (existing mortgagors reﬁnance at lower rates
of interest).4 Thus, the upward price movement in a mortgage due to a drop in
interest rates is constrained by a decrease in the anticipated duration of the cash
ﬂows.
When interest rates rise, prepayments decline because housing turnover decreases,
and fewer reﬁnancings occur. As a result, the anticipated duration of the cash
ﬂows increases, placing additional downward price pressure on mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities.5 Thus, the rate of prepayment may be modeled as a
function of several variables:
PPR  ƒ(I, HT, RE, DF, Other), (8)
where:
PPR  Prepayment rate;
I  General level of interest rates;
HT  Housing turnover;
RE  Level of reﬁnancing activity;
DF  Defaults on mortgages; and
Other  Other factors (such as divorce, death, etc.), which are assumed to be
constant.
In general, PPR/I  0; PPR/HT 0; PPR/RE  0; and PPR/DF 
0. Since housing turnover, reﬁnancings and defaults are also affected by changes
in interest rates, the partial derivatives are: HT/I  0; RE/I  0; and DF/
I  0.CMOs, Duration Risk and a New Mortgage  79
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Finally, the duration (DUR) of the cash ﬂows to the mortgagees and owners of
mortgage-backed securities is inversely related to the rate of prepayment, hence
DUR/PPR  0. As a result, duration can be expected to decrease when interest
rates fall, reﬁnancings rise and defaults rise. Conversely, duration can be expected
to increase when interest rates rise, reﬁnancings fall and defaults decline.
 The AAM
For a typical constant monthly payment, a FRM with a term of N months, annual
interest rate i (monthly interest rate  i/12), and original loan balance P0, the
monthly payment R, which will amortize the mortgage to a $0 balance at the end
of time period N, is given by:
P0 R  (9) N 1  t (1  [i/12]) t1
Where the divisor on the right-hand side of Equation (9) is the present value of
an annuity factor. The remaining principal balance on the mortgage after n
payments have been made (Pn) is given by:
N 1
P  R* . (10)  n tn (1  [i/12]) tn1
Under most FRM contracts, if the borrower makes additional principal payments
(prepayments) at any point in time (PPn) so that the remaining principal balance
(P  Pn  PPn) is lowered, subsequent monthly payments remain at R, but the * n
term of the mortgage is reduced. However, the borrower is not compelled, at any
point in time, to make a payment larger than R.
In a rising interest rate environment, the market values of FRMs (and the securities
written against them) decline as the cash ﬂows are discounted at higher rates.
Exacerbating the decline in values due to rising interest rates is the likelihood that
prepayments (in whole, or in part) will also decline for the reasons stated in the
previous section. A decline in prepayments increases the duration of the mortgage,
placing additional downward pressure on prices.
For example, given a change in the required rate of return on a CMO Tranche j
from r to r*, the change in the market value of Tranche j can be modeled as:80  Thode
NN (C  P )( C  P ) j,t,r* j,t,r* j,t,rj ,t,r V  (11)  j tt (1  r*) (1  r) t0 t0
If it is assumed that the prepayment rate on the underlying mortgages is unaffected
by the change in required return, then C  C and P  P .6
J,t,r* j,t,rj ,t,r* j,t,r
However, if the prepayment rate changes along with a change in required return,
then C  C and P  P . As a result, CF  CF . Therefore, since j,t,r* j,t,rj ,t,r* j,t,rj ,t,r* j,t,r
duration (and, by translation, modiﬁed duration) is affected by the change in the
prepayment rate, then the left-hand side of Equation (2) will understate the
magnitude of the security price change if changes in prepayment rates decline
with an increase in required return. The additional change in the price of the
security, over and above the approximation given by Equation (2), can be referred
to as prepayment risk.
 Constructing an AAM
It is possible to design a FRM that reduces the buyer’s exposure to prepayment
risk in a volatile interest rate environment. Such a FRM is one where the
amortization of principal is accelerated in response to an upward change in interest
rates.7 Similar in construct to an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), the adjustable
amortization mortgage (AAM) is a FRM with a (possibly) variable payment. That
is, like an ARM, the monthly payment on an AAM is adjusted periodically to
reﬂect changes in the general level of interest rates. However, unlike an ARM,
the interest rate on the AAM remains constant throughout its life so that any
adjustments in the monthly payment are credited directly against the remaining
principal balance of the mortgage.
Rather than transferring interest rate risk (in part or in whole) from the lender to
the borrower as is done with an ARM, the AAM transfers prepayment risk from
the lender to the borrower. As a result, AAMs (and AAM-backed securities) render
some price volatility protection to their owners that FRMs do not offer. Unlike a
growing equity mortgage (GEM) that has scheduled increases in amortization
independent of market interest rate changes, the AAM has unscheduled changes
in amortization strictly tied to changes in market interest rates. However, the GEM
and AAM are similar in that there may be changes over time in the pay rate for
amortization purposes while the underlying accrual rate remains unchanged.
Likewise, the graduated payment mortgage (GPM) has scheduled increases in
amortization independent of market interest rate changes (and variable pay rate,
but constant accrual rate). GPMs often have substantial negative amortization in
their early years—a possibility not permitted under the AAM since the pay rate
of AAM is always equal to or greater than the accrual rate.CMOs, Duration Risk and a New Mortgage  81
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A fairly straightforward AAM is similar in construct to an ARM. The payment
on the AAM is adjusted periodically (perhaps annually); there is a well-deﬁned
underlying index rate of interest upon which changes in the payments are
benchmarked; there is a deﬁned margin over the index rate; and, the AAM may
have periodic as well as life of loan caps and ﬂoors on the amount the monthly
payment may be changed.
Exhibit 1 illustrates an example of an AAM. The term of the mortgage is thirty
years, carrying an interest rate of 7.0%. That interest rate is based on the index
rate at the time of origination (5.0%)8 plus a margin over the index rate (2.0%).
If this were a standard FRM, the borrower would make monthly, constant
payments of $665.30 throughout the entire 360-month term of the mortgage.
With an AAM, each year, on the anniversary date of the mortgage, the current
value of the index is read and the margin added to this value. Monthly payments
on the AAM are then adjusted via Equation (9) using the sum of the current index
rate plus the margin as the interest rate. However, since the interest rate is ﬁxed,
any increase (or decrease) in the monthly payment represents an adjustment to
principal amortization, not an adjustment to interest.
For example, in Exhibit 1, the index rate rises by one percentage point by the end
of the ﬁrst year (month twelve). As a result, the monthly payment for months
thirteen–twenty-four is reset based on the $98,984.19 remaining principal balance,
twenty-nine year (348 month) remaining term and an interest rate of 8.0% (current
index rate plus margin). As is seen in Exhibit 1, the payment rises to $732.43.
All of the incremental payment is credited against principal, not interest, since the
interest rate is ﬁxed. Likewise, at the end of twenty-four months, the index is
again observed and the payment adjusted using index plus margin as the interest
rate i in Equation (9).
It should also be noted that, unlike a standard FRM, the term of the AAM is not
affected by accelerated payments to principal. This is because the payment is
adjusted annually based on retaining the original term of thirty years.9
 Valuing AAM-Backed Securities
A typical sequential payment CMO is illustrated in Exhibits 2–4. Exhibit 2
illustrates a typical collateralized Mortgage obligation. The owner of a portfolio
of $420 million (face value) thirty-year term, 8% APR FRMs has created a four-
tranche CMO (A, B, C and Z) with each tranche carrying a face value of $100
million. The residual $20 million represents overcollateralization in the event of
defaults or late payments by mortgagors. To create claims with different maturities,
the principal cash ﬂow from the mortgage payments is sequential, i.e., all principal
payments ﬁrst go to Tranche A, then Tranche B, etc. Further, to create a fairly
long-lived tranche, Tranche Z not only does not receive any principal payments
until all the other tranches have been completely repaid, Tranche Z’s coupon
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Exhibit 2  A Typical Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (000s omitted)





Tranche A Required Return (%) 7.000
Coupon (%) 7.000
Amount ($) 100,000
Tranche B Required Return (%) 7.250
Coupon (%) 7.250
Amount ($) 100,000
Tranche C Required Return (%) 7.500
Coupon (%) 7.500
Amount ($) 100,000
Tranche Z Required Return (%) 8.500
Coupon (%) 8.500
Amount ($) 100,000
Notes: CMO is a sequential payment CMO, i.e., Tranche A receives all mortgage principal payments
ﬁrst, then Tranche B, then Tranche C, then Tranche Z. Tranches A, B and C receive coupon interest
beginning at the end of year 1. Tranche Z receives no coupon interest until all other tranches have
been completely paid off. In the interim, Tranche Z is credited with accrued interest and the interest
that would normally be paid to Tranche Z is paid to the other tranches (in sequence) as additional
principal payments.
The overcollateralization creates a residual equity class, which receives the residual cash ﬂow each
year after the claims of all tranches have been paid.
PSA stands for the Public Securities Association. A prepayment rate of ‘‘100% of PSA’’ translates to a
prepayment rate of approximately 2% the ﬁrst year, 4% the second year and 6% in all subsequent
years.
tranches, in sequence. Thus, Tranche Z receives no cash ﬂow whatsoever until all
other tranches have been completely paid off. To simplify the illustration, it is
assumed that mortgage payments are received into the pool once each at the end
of the year, and that payments are made to the tranche(s) once each year at the
end of the year.10
Assuming a positively-sloped yield curve, the required rate of return on each
tranche is an increasing function of the tranche’s expected duration. Hence,
Tranche A, with the shortest duration, carries the lowest coupon interest rate;
Tranche Z, with the longest duration, carries the highest coupon interest rate. The
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underlying mortgages approximates the Public Securities Association (PSA)
prepayment rate curve.11
The left-hand side of Panels A–D of Exhibit 4, illustrates the sequence of principal
and coupon interest payments to the various tranches as well as the expected
durations and component values of the claims (interest-only and principal-only
claims). Since the example assumes all tranches are sold at par, the total value of
each tranche is the par value. Because Tranche Z receives no payments of any
kind until all the other tranches have been extinguished, it has a substantially
longer duration than Tranches A, B and C. This difference is magniﬁed by the
application of accrued interest cash ﬂows to the other tranches.
The center of Panels C–F illustrates the dual effects of a structural shift increase
in interest rates by two percentage points (causing the required return on all
tranches to increase by two percentage points) and a simultaneous reduction in
the anticipated level of prepayments by one-third (66.667% of PSA).12 For every
tranche, duration increases (most dramatically for Tranche Z where it increases
by almost one-and-a-half years) and the PO values decline signiﬁcantly. For
Tranches A, B and C, the IO values increase marginally since the decline in
prepayments results in larger and longer coupon interest payments. For Tranche
Z, the IO value declines since the (now more heavily discounted) coupon interest
payments are further in the future.
In toto, the market value of the claims to Tranches A, B, C and Z have declined
by approximately $51 million from $400 million to roughly $349 million before
adjusting for the effects of changes in expected duration on required returns.13
Applying the AAM
Suppose now that the underlying mortgage pool backing the CMOs is composed
of ﬁxed-rate, AMMs of the type described previously. In this case, if interest rates
were to rise by two percentage points, the total monthly payments on the
underlying mortgage would be adjusted upward (based on a 10% interest rate
rather than an 8% interest rate) with all of the additional cash inﬂows credited to
principal.
As illustrated in Panel A of Exhibit 3, the total cash ﬂow available for distribution
to tranche holders rises signiﬁcantly as the amortization is accelerated. In fact, the
adjustment in the speed of amortization substantially offsets the decline in
prepayments as a result of interest rates increasing. As is shown on the right-hand
side of Panels A–E of Exhibit 4, the expected durations of Tranches A, B, C and
Z return almost exactly to the expected durations of these tranches before an
increase in interest rates occurred. And the total payments to each of the tranches
each period returns to roughly the same values as they were before the rise in
interest rates. Thus, increasing ‘‘involuntary’’ payments of principal ameliorates
the decline in ‘‘voluntary’’ prepayments.98  Thode
Exhibit 5  Summary Statistics
Tranche Original ($)
Interest Rates Rise by 2%
FRM ($) AAM ($)
A PO Value 85,078 79,691 82,459
IO Value 14,922 15,796 13,643
Total Value 100,000 95,487 96,102
Duration 2.281 2.483 2.139
Modiﬁed Duration 2.132 2.278 1.962
B PO Value 69,603 58,666 63,545
IO Value 30,397 32,397 28,573
Total Value 100,000 91,063 92,128
Duration 4.497 5.036 4.423
Modiﬁed Duration 4.193 4.610 4.049
C PO Value 56,067 43,563 48,266
IO Value 43,933 44,556 40,843
Total Value 100,000 88,119 89,109
Duration 6.297 6.777 6.195
Modiﬁed Duration 5.858 6.189 5.568
Z PO Value 49,405 37,760 42,141
IO Value 50,595 36,870 34,567
Total Value 100,000 74,630 76,708
Duration 14.458 15.851 14.361
Modiﬁed Duration 13.325 14.345 12.996
The overall effect of the application of the AAM is best illustrated in Exhibit 5,
which summarizes the PO, IO and total values, as well as the duration and
modiﬁed duration of each tranche under all three scenarios. With the increase in
interest rates, the use of the accelerated amortization mortgage increases the PO
values of all four tranches signiﬁcantly. Despite a decline in IO values across all
four tranches (the time period over which coupon interest is paid is now shortened
for all four tranches), the overall effect is to raise the cumulative market values
of the four tranches by about $5 million to $354 million.
Pricing the AAM
Due to the similarities between the sharing of interest rate risk between lenders
and borrowers in ARMs, and the sharing of duration risk between lender and
borrower in AAMs, the expected yield relationships and terms of an AAM relative
to an FRM follow a similar logic:
1. At origination, the initial interest rate on an AAM should be less than the
interest rate on an FRM of the same term due to the beneﬁts of shifting
a portion of the duration risk. Further, since the principal balance on anCMOs, Duration Risk and a New Mortgage  99
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AAM will never be higher, and is likely to be lower at any point in time
subsequent to origination than an FRM, default risk is also likely to be
lower unless the FRM borrower makes principal prepayments.
2. Since short-term interest rates tend to be more variable than long-term
interest rates, AAMs with short-term indexes are riskier to borrowers.
Thus, an AAM borrower should expect to pay less (a lower risk premium
and expected yield) for an AAM with a short-term index than for an AAM
with a longer-term index.
3. Similarly, the more rapid the adjustment interval, the greater the shift in
duration risk to the borrower. Thus, an AAM borrower should expect to
pay less (a lower risk premium and expected yield) for an AAM with
shorter adjustment (reset) periods than for an AAM with longer
adjustment (reset) periods.
4. To the extent that the AAM contains maximum life-of-loan and/or
periodic caps on pay interest rate adjustments, the duration risk assumed
by the borrower will be lower. The more restrictive the caps, the higher
the expected yield ought to be to the lender. Correspondingly, the more
severe the ﬂoors (life-of-loan and/or periodic) on pay interest rate
adjustments, the lower expected yield ought to be to the lender as the
decline in the pay interest rate to the borrower is more restricted.
Marketing the AAM
While the AAM may be attractive to mortgage-backed securities investors, some
characteristics make it less attractive to borrowers. Like an ARM, the total monthly
payment on an AAM will rise with an increase in interest rates, even though,
unlike an ARM, all of the incremental payment goes to principal reduction. Many
borrowers may not fully appreciate the distinction. This may lead many borrowers
to choose a ﬁxed payment, FRM over an AAM, just as the literature shows
borrowers choosing FRMs over ARMs in high and rising interest rate
environments (Sa-Aadu, 1987; Brueckner and Follain, 1988, 1989; Follain, 1990;
and Szerb, 1996, for example). In a declining interest rate environment, the AAM
might become more popular among borrowers, but, absent fairly restrictive
periodic and life-of-loan pay rate ﬂoors, the AAM will not be very popular among
mortgage-backed securities investors.
The following might be done to generate interest in AAMs in the primary and
secondary markets:
1. Backing by government-sponsored entities, such as GNMA, FNMA and
FHLMC, would assure guarantees to buyers of securities backed by
AAMs and encourage standardization of AAM terms.
2. Positive marketing and consumer information efforts, and agency
intervention—similar to those associated with GPMs—could conceivably
generate interest in AAMs in the primary market.
3. Appropriate AAM pricing that clearly illustrates the beneﬁts to potential
borrowers and lenders.100  Thode
Future Research
The offering of AAMs as a substitute for traditional FRMs represents an
opportunity to insulate owners of these mortgages (and the securities backed by
these mortgages) from duration risk, especially in a rising interest rate
environment. To more clearly identify the potential beneﬁts, a number of issues
must be addressed:
1. If there were both a primary and secondary market for AAMs, to what
extent should the duration risk be shared between mortgagor and
mortgagee? Speciﬁcally, what would be the appropriate caps and ﬂoors
on amortization adjustments—both periodically and over the life of the
loan? Additional theoretical research as well as simulations could provide
additional evidence on different AAM structures.
2. Along the same lines, what are the appropriate underlying indexes for use
with an AAM, and the appropriate margin over the index for initial pricing
of these loans?
3. Assuming a standardized AAM could be created, what is the appropriate
interest rate reduction for a borrower taking out an AAM as opposed to
a standard ﬁxed-rate mortgage?
 Conclusion
This article has proposed a new FRM where the amortization is adjusted to reﬂect
changes in the level of interest rates. Conceptually, the objective is to create a
mortgage that has less duration risk for mortgage buyers and for buyers of
securities backed by those mortgages. It is shown that such a mortgage has the
potential to effectively insulate mortgagees and securities owners from changes in
expected duration as a result in changes in principal prepayment patterns arising
from changes in the general level of interest rates.
 Endnotes
1 Note that the summation in the denominator on the right-hand side of Equation (1)
is the PRICE of the security.
2 As in the case of a ﬁxed coupon, non-callable, default-free security such as a United
States government bond. Where cash ﬂows each period may change as yields
change (e.g., callable debt, ﬂoating rate debt, or where principal prepayments may
also change), it is more appropriate to place an expectations operator (E) in front
of the periodic cash ﬂows variable (CFt) in Equation (1).
3 To broaden the duration across tranches, so-called ‘‘companion’’ CMOs permit the
longest maturity tranche to accrue interest as long as any other tranche is still
‘‘alive.’’ This accrued interest is paid in cash to earlier-maturing tranches as a
principal allocation, reducing their duration. The accrued interest is credited to the
later-maturing tranche as marked-up principal.CMOs, Duration Risk and a New Mortgage  101
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4 Reﬁnancings are dampened by what is known as ‘‘burnout.’’ Even though it may
be ﬁnancially attractive to reﬁnance, some mortgagors do not reﬁnance for a variety
of reasons: inability to qualify for a new mortgage, ignorance of the beneﬁts of
reﬁnancing, transaction costs, etc.
5 Foreclosures also tend to increase in a rising interest rate environment that may
accelerate prepayments and dampen price declines. However, foreclosures may not
permit mortgagors and security holders to recover the entire principal value of their
investments.
6 If prepayments decline, then principal payments to all tranches occur over a longer
period of time. As a result, coupon interest payments continue for a longer period
of time. Similarly, if prepayments increase, principal payments to all tranches occur
over a shorter period of time. Thus, coupon interest payments are made over a
shorter time period.
7 Similarly, amortization is decelerated in response to a downward change in interest
rates. However, as mortgage interest rates decline, home sales and reﬁnancings will
accelerate, mitigating the deceleration in amortization.
8 Analogous to an ARM, the underlying index could be a U.S. Treasury security
rate, for example, the rate on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds.
9 As a result, the AAM may provide some modest duration risk protection for the
mortgagee as interest rates fall since the mortgagor’s monthly payment also
declines. Some mortgagors, who might otherwise reﬁnance as interest rates fall,
may elect, instead, to continue making the (now lower) monthly payments on the
AAM. This is aptly illustrated in Exhibit 1 beginning in month 49. The index rate
plus margin has returned to its original level (7.0%). However, because principal
payments were accelerated in months thirteen through forty-eight, the total monthly
payment beginning in month forty-nine is lower than the original total monthly
payment ($642.93 vs. $665.30).
10 The presentation is similar to that of Brueggeman and Fisher (1997).
11 The PSA prepayment rate curve (‘‘100% of PSA’’) assumes prepayments of 0.2%
per month the ﬁrst year, then increases by 0.2% per month through month 30, then
levels off at 0.5% per month (6% annually) for the remaining stated maturity. See,
for example, Brueggeman and Fisher (1997). Because the example used here
assumes annual payments, the assumed prepayment rate that corresponds to ‘‘100%
of PSA’’ is 2% the ﬁrst year, 4% the second year, and 6% in all subsequent years.
12 The exact magnitude of the reduction in the prepayment rate is, of course, unknown
a priori. 66.67% was chosen for illustration purposes only. Results using other
percentages would yield results in the same direction so long as it is assumed that
an increase in interest rates causes a reduction in prepayments.
13 The reported market values for Tranches A, B, C and Z on the right-hand side of
Exhibit 4, Panels A through D, overstate the ‘‘true’’ market values if required
returns are positively correlated with expected duration, as would be the case if
the yield curve is positively-sloped. The interest-rate risk or liquidity premium
hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates has extremely strong empirical
support as reported by Fama (1984a, b) and McEnally and Jordan (1991) among
others.102  Thode
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